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Stepwise training supports strategic second-order theory of mind
in turn-taking games
Rineke Verbrugge∗ Ben Meijering† Stefan Wierda‡ Hedderik van Rijn§ Niels Taatgen∗
Abstract
People model other people’s mental states in order to understand and predict their behavior. Sometimes they model what
others think about them as well: “He thinks that I intend to stop.” Such second-order theory of mind is needed to navigate
some social situations, for example, to make optimal decisions in turn-taking games. Adults sometimes find this very difficult.
Sometimes they make decisions that do not fit their predictions about the other player. However, the main bottleneck for
decision makers is to take a second-order perspective required to make a correct opponent model. We report a methodical
investigation into supporting factors that help adults do better. We presented subjects with two-player, three-turn games in
which optimal decisions required second-order theory of mind (Hedden and Zhang, 2002). We applied three “scaffolds” that,
theoretically, should facilitate second-order perspective-taking: 1) stepwise training, from simple one-person games to games
requiring second-order theory of mind; 2) prompting subjects to predict the opponent’s next decision before making their own
decision; and 3) a realistic visual task representation. The performance of subjects in the eight resulting combinations shows
that stepwise training, but not the other two scaffolds, improves subjects’ second-order opponent models and thereby their own
decisions.
Keywords: decision making, second-order theory of mind, opponent modeling, scaffolding, turn-taking games, sequential
games, centipede, strategic reasoning, perfect-information games
1 Introduction
Why is it that, while we are often told to put ourselves into an-
other person’s shoes, we fail to do so when it’s most needed?
Consider the Camp David negotiations in 1978. Egypt’s
President Sadat first presented a tough official proposal, but
then wrote a much friendlier informal letter to the mediator,
US President Carter. This letter contained his fallback posi-
tions about the issues on the table. Even though Carter did
not tell the exact contents of this letter to Israel’s President,
Begin still knew about its existence. Sadat failed to wonder
about the crucial question: “Does Begin know that Carter
knows my fallback positions?” Begin used his knowledge
by pushing towards Sadat’s fallback positions in the further
negotiations and he made sure that everyone knew that the
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Israeli parliament would not allow Begin to make any con-
cessions on the Palestinian question, which was ultimately
left unresolved in the final Camp David Accords (Telhami,
1992; Oakman, 2002). What was Sadat missing?
Many of our daily social interactions also require the abil-
ity to infer another person’s knowledge, beliefs, desires, and
intentions. For example, if we are trying to sell our house, we
are reasoning about whether the potential buyer knows that
we already bought a new house. The ability to put ourselves
in other people’s shoes and reason about their beliefs, knowl-
edge, plans and intentions, which may differ from our own,
is called theory of mind (henceforth usually ToM, coined by
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978)). To be more specific, we use
first-order theory of mind to ascribe a simple mental state
about world facts to someone, for example: “Ann believes
that I wrote this novel under pseudonym, but in fact I did
not.” This ability to make correct first-order attributions is
apparent around the age of 4 (Wellman, Cross, & Watson,
2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Second-order theory of
mind adds an extra layer of mental state attribution, as in:
“Bob doesn’t know that I know that he is the pseudonymous
author of this novel.”
Second-order ToM is indispensable in a host of social
situations. It is needed in communication to understand po-
liteness, humor, irony, faux pas, and lying (Filippova & Ast-
ington, 2008; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007; Hsu & Cheung,
2013). Second-order ToM is also needed to make correct
decisions in strategic interactions, for example, to win com-
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petitive games and to propose offers that lead to win-win
solutions in negotiations, as has been shown using agent
simulations (Weerd, Verbrugge, & Verheij, 2013, 2017).1
So it is a very useful ability, but it is also very hard, and it
appears to be developed rather late in childhood.
1.1 Theory of mind is hard: communication,
judgment and decision making
Second-order theory of mind starts to appear between the
ages of five and seven, when children start to correctly answer
second-order false belief questions such as “Where does
Mary think that John will look for the chocolate?” about
a story in which John peeked in though a window and saw
Mary moving John’s piece of chocolate from the drawer to
the toybox, while Mary wasn’t aware that John had seen her
in the act (Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, &
Tager-Flusberg, 1994; Arslan, Hohenberger, & Verbrugge,
2017). This ability continues to develop during adolescence.
Typical adults often display a reasonable understanding of
up to fourth-order mental state attributions in stories, e.g.
“Alice thinks that Bob doesn’t know that she knows that
he knows that she sent him an anonymous Valentine card”
(Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998).2
However, in social situations, even adults may fail to
take other people’s perspectives into account. For exam-
ple in communication, a hearer often doesn’t realize that a
speaker cannot see some of the objects that the hearer can see
(Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010). Also, when people are asked
to make judgements about other people’s problem solving
skills, they often fail to apply useful cues such as speed of
answering (Mata & Almeida, 2014).
In the “Beauty Contest”, all subjects simultaneously have
to pick among 1,. . . , 100 the number they believe will be
closest to 2/3 of the average of all subjects’ choices. Many
people guess 33, which is 2/3 times the average of 1,. . . ,100,
thus not taking the perspective of other subjects. Fewer
people do use theory of mind and choose at most 22, which
is 2/3 times 33 (Nagel, 1995; Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2015).
Limited use of theory of mind among adults has also been
shown in social dilemmas such as the public goods game and
the prisoner’s dilemma (Colman, 2003; Kieslich & Hilbig,
2014; Rubinstein & Salant, 2016), the trust game (Evans
& Krueger, 2011, 2014), and one-shot games such as hide-
and-seek, matching pennies and the Mod game (Devaine,
Hollard, & Daunizeau, 2014a, 2014b; Frey & Goldstone,
2013; Weerd, Diepgrond, & Verbrugge, 2017). In all these
games, subjects’ decisions in experiments do not fit with
1In these experiments, third and higher orders of ToM hardly offer any
additional payoff over and above second-order theory of mind.
2People with autism spectrum disorder undergo a slower development
of theory of mind in general and recursive false belief understanding in
particular; their perspective-taking difficulties often remain into adulthood
(Happé, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Kui-
jper, Hartman, Bogaerds-Hazenberg, & Hendriks, 2017).
the game-theoretically optimal predicted decision based on
common knowledge of rationality, the computation of which
requires at least second-order theory of mind.3
1.2 ToM in turn-taking games is hard, too
Particularly difficult tasks requiring theory of mind are turn-
taking games, also called sequential games or dynamic
games. For example, in chess, players have to reason about
what their opponents would do in their next move, where
the opponent in turn thinks about the first player. Chess is
a typical turn-taking game where black and white alternate
moves; it is also a perfect- and complete-information game
in the sense that both players know the history and rules of
the game, in contrast to a game like bridge, in which players
cannot see one another’s cards. Turn-taking games can be
represented by extensive form game trees (see Figures 1 and
2).
So far, a number of turn-taking games of perfect and com-
plete information have been investigated. Games that require
second-order theory of mind to make optimal decisions ap-
pear to be especially difficult. Whereas 8 year old children
already perform at ceiling in second-order false belief story
understanding, they start to apply second-order theory of
mind in turn-taking games only when they are between 8
and 10 years old, and even then their decisions are on aver-
age only slightly better than chance level (Flobbe, Verbrugge,
Hendriks, & Krämer, 2008; Raijmakers, Mandell, van Es, &
Counihan, 2014; Meijering, Taatgen, van Rijn, &Verbrugge,
2014; Arslan, Verbrugge, Taatgen, & Hollebrandse, 2015).
Even adults are slow to take the perspective of the op-
ponent, let alone to accurately model what their opponent
thinks about them, in turn-taking games such as the cen-
tipede game and sequential bargaining (Johnson, Camerer,
Sen, & Rymon, 2002; Bicchieri, 1989; McKelvey & Palfrey,
1992; Kawagoe & Takizawa, 2012; Ghosh, Heifetz, Ver-
brugge, & deWeerd, 2017; Bhatt &Camerer, 2005; Camerer
et al., 2015; Nagel & Tang, 1998; Ho & Su, 2013). Hedden
and Zhang (2002) found that participants on average start
with a default, myopic (first-order) theory-of-mind model of
the opponent, though the depth of such mental model may
be adjusted according to their opponent?s type upon their
continued interactions. Zhang, Hedden and Chia (2012) fur-
ther manipulated perspective taking and showed (p.567) that
there is a cost of a factor of 0.65 in terms of likelihood of
3In behavioral economics, recursive modeling of other people’s possible
future decisions is often modeled through iterated best-response models
such as level-n models (Nagel, 1995; Kawagoe & Takizawa, 2012; Ho &
Su, 2013) and cognitive hierarchies (Camerer et al., 2015). These models
are similar to each other and to our orders of theory ofmind in that someone’s
level of sophistication is said to be k+1 if he considers the others to be of level
(at most) k. The main differences between the models are in the definitions
of the ground level (zero-order) and in whether agents are assumed to have
a fixed level or to adapt their level to the opponent’s behavior.
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Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Pl. 1 D: (1,4)
A: (3,2) B: (4,3) C: (2,1)
Figure 1: Decision tree for an example turn-taking game in
which Player 1 chooses first; if he chooses to go right, then
Player 2 chooses, and if Player 2 also chooses to go right,
finally Player 1 decides again. The pairs at the leaves A,
B, C, and D represent the payoffs of Player 1 and Player 2,
respectively. This payoff structure corresponds to the Marble
Drop game of Figure 5 (c). Figure adapted from Figure 2 of
(Rosenthal, 1981) and Figure 1 of (Hedden & Zhang, 2002)
engaging in second-order versus first-order theory-of-mind
reasoning.
All these empirical results contradict the prescription of
game theory that players, on the basis of common knowledge
of their rationality, apply backward induction (Osborne &
Rubinstein, 1994), which we now explain.
Backward induction
In the typical extensive form game tree of Figure 1, backward
induction would run as follows. Player 1 is rational, so at
the final decision node, he would decide to go down to C,
because his payoff of 2 there is larger than his payoff of 1 in
D. Therefore, we can replace the final decision node and its
two children by the node (2,1). Taking Player 1’s rationality
into account, at the second decision point, a rational Player 2
would decide to go down to B, because her payoff of 3 there
is larger than her payoff of 1 in the node (2,1). So we can
replace the second decision point and its children by the node
(4,3). Finally, at the first decision point, the rational Player
1, believing that Player 2 believes that Player 1 is rational,
would decide to move to the right, because his payoff of 4
in the node (4,3) is larger than the payoff of 3 that he would
receive if ending the game at A.
In summary, reasoning from the end at the right to the
beginning of the game, Player 1 deletes non-optimal actions,
one by one. Note that the Backward Induction concept re-
quires both players to reason about what would happen at
each possible node, even if that node is never reached in
practice (Bicchieri, 1989). But do people really do so?
One paradigm to study how people actually reason in turn-
taking games is theMatrix Game, which will also be the base
game in our experiment.
The Matrix Game
The Matrix Game is a turn-taking game between Player 1
and Player 2, introduced by (Hedden & Zhang, 2002). A
typical example can be found in Figure 3. Each of four cells
Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Pl. 1 D: (2,2)
A: (3,1) B: (4,3) C: (1,4)
Figure 2: Decision tree with a payoff structure corresponding
to the Matrix Game of Figure 3
Figure 3: The Matrix Game. Figure adapted from Figure 2
of (Hedden & Zhang, 2002)
named A, B, C, and D contains a pair of rewards, so-called
payoffs. In each cell, the left number in the payoff pair is
Player 1’s payoff and the right number is Player 2’s payoff if
the game were to end up in that cell. For both players, their
payoffs in cells A, B, C, D range over the numbers 1, 2, 3,
4 and are all different, that is, there are no relevant payoff
ties. Each game starts at cell A. Both players alternately
decide whether to stay in the current cell or to move on to
the next one. In particular, Player 1 decides whether to stay
in cell A or to go to cell B. If the game has not ended yet,
Player 2 then decides whether to stay in cell B or to move
to cell C. If the game still has not ended, Player 1 finally
decides whether to stay in cell C or to move to D. The goal
of Player 1 is that the game ends in a cell in which the left
payoff is as high as possible, while the goal of Player 2 is that
the game ends in a cell in which the right payoff is as high
as possible. Thus, both players have a self-interested goal,
namely, to maximize their own payoff in the cell in which
the game ends up. Unlike many competitive games, it is not
a goal to win more points than the opponent and maximize
the difference. And, unlike cooperative tasks, it is not a goal
to maximize the sum of both players’ payoffs.
Still, when making their own decisions, players do have
to reason about each other. At cell A in the Matrix Game
of Figure 3, Player 1 could correctly reason about a rational
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opponent: “Player 2 believes that I intend to move to cell D
at my last decision point, because my payoff there is higher
than in cell C. At D, however, Player 2 only wins a payoff of
2, so he intends to stay at B in order to get the higher payoff
3. But that is excellent for me, because ending up at B will
give me a payoff of 4. Therefore, I decide to move on to B.”
Adults have trouble making the correct mental model of
the other player (Hedden & Zhang, 2002; Zhang, Hedden,
& Chia, 2012): The proportion of games in which subjects
made correct second-order predictions about their opponent
was only 60%–70%, even at the end of the cited experi-
ments.4 Adolescents and young adults have an even harder
time playing the Matrix Game if they are sequentially pitted
against against both “myopic” (zero-order ToM) and ‘pre-
dictive’ (first-order ToM) opponents (Li, Liu, & Zhu, 2011).
1.3 Supporting strategic second-order ToM
We present an experiment to investigate how adults can best
be supported in applying second-order theory of mind in
games with three decisions such as the Matrix Game. Ad-
vantages of these games are that it is possible to construct
games of different levels of complexity in terms of required
theory of mind and to develop an idea of subjects’ reasoning
strategies on the basis of their mistakes.
In order to correctly gauge subjects’ level of theory of
mind from their decisions, we need to test them in a large
number of different game items, so that they cannot find an
optimal solution just by pattern recognition alone. Fortu-
nately, for the Matrix Game, it is possible to devise many
different payoff distributions that require such second-order
perspective taking on the part of Player 1, whowants to make
an optimal decision at the start of the game.
Controlling the opponent’s decisions
If we want to support people in their second-order theory
of mind, it is important to control the strategy and the level
of theory of mind used by the opponent: A subject displays
second-order theory of mind by making a correct mental
model of a first-order opponent. To achieve this, many re-
searchers use a human confederate of the experimenter, who
strictly follows pre-determined strategies (Hedden & Zhang,
2002; Zhang et al., 2012; Li et al., 2011; Goodie, Doshi, &
Young, 2012). In many studies, subjects play against a com-
puter opponent. In such cases, they are sometimes deceived
by a story that they are playing against another human be-
ing (Hedden & Zhang, 2002); other times, they are told that
they are playing “against four different players” (Devaine et
al., 2014a); at the most honest end of the spectrum, subjects
are told that they are playing against a very smart computer
opponent, possibly including information about the oppo-
nent’s rationality or level of perspective taking (Hedden &
4By chance alone, the proportion would have been 50%, given that
games had been balanced in terms of ‘stay’ or ‘go’ predictions.
Zhang, 2002; Weerd, Verbrugge, & Verheij, 2017; Ghosh et
al., 2017). We choose the honest procedure here.5
Scaffolding new skills
Wood and colleagues introduced the term “scaffolding” to
describe the types of support that an adult or expert could
give to a child that initially is not able to solve a problem
or perform a task: “This scaffolding consists essentially of
the adult ‘controlling’ those elements of the task that are
initially beyond the learner’s capacity, thus permitting him
to concentrate upon and complete only those elements that
are within his range of competence” (Wood, Bruner, & Ross,
1976, p. 90). Recently, scaffolding has also been used in the
context of adults learning new skills (Clark, 1997), as we
will do here.6
In our experiment, we attempt to support subjects’ strate-
gic second-order theory of mind by three different scaffolds:
1. Stepwise training (compared to Undifferentiated train-
ing);
2. Prompting them for predictions of their opponent’s next
decision (compared to No prompts);
3. using a more intuitive visual Task representation called
Marble Drop (compared to the Matrix Game).
In the next section, we explain the three scaffolds in detail
as well as the a priori reasons why they may be helpful.
We also discuss the methods of the experiment. In Section
3, we present the results and explain which factors (alone or
together) influence the performance of decisionmakers in the
two-player turn-taking games. In Section 4, we zoom in both
on the kinds of mistakes subjects made and on the reasoning
strategies underlying their optimal decisions. We conclude




Ninety-three first-year psychology students (63 female) with
a mean age of 21 years (ranging between 18 and 31 years)
participated in exchange for course credit. All subjects had
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. One subject
was excluded due to an error in the experimental setup.
5Hedden and Zhang (2002) have compared different treatments and have
shown that inclusion of a cover story about the opponent being a human or
a computer did not affect subjects’ performance. Interestingly, Goodie and
colleagues (2012) state that people may actually be able to take a second-
order perspective but that they do not use it, simply because they have such
low opinions of their fellow human beings’ level of reasoning.
6Thus, scaffolding is relevant for those skills that are in a child’s “zone of
proximal development”, as defined by (Vygotsky, 1987). For a Vygotskian
theory on scaffolding in pre-school children’s development of first-order
theory of mind, see (Fernyhough, 2008).
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2.2 Design
The experimental design comprised three factors: train-
ing, prompting predictions, and task representation. All
factors were administered to 93 subjects in a 2 × 2 ×
2 between-subject design, with Stepwise/Undifferentiated
training crossed with Prompt/No-Prompt crossed with
Marble-Drop/Matrix-Game.7 The experiment consisted of
three blocks: one training block followed by two test blocks.
We nowproceed to explain the three factors training, prompt-
ing predictions, and task representation in detail, and to ex-
plain a priori why each of the three manipulations should
provide the kind scaffolding discussed in the Introduction,
to support decision makers in their second-order theory of
mind and in making optimal decisions in the games.
2.3 Scaffold 1: Training
The training block was included to familiarize subjects with
the rules of the games. Subjects were randomly assigned to
one of two training procedures. In one training procedure,
subjects were presented with Hedden and Zhang’s (2002)
24 original training games (see Figure 4; top panel). These
so-called “trivial” training games are easier to play than truly
second-order games such as in the game on the bottom right
in Figure 4, because Player 2 does not have to reason about
Player 1’s last possible decision: Player 2’s payoff in B is
either lower or higher than both his payoffs in C and D. For
example, in the game in the upper panel of Figure 4, to make
an optimal decision, it suffices for the subject to make the
following correct first-order attribution: “The other player
intends to move from B to C, because his goal is to earn as
many points as possible, and in both C (3 points) and D (4
points), he will receive more points than if he stays in B (2
points).”
This training procedure will henceforth be referred to as
Undifferentiated training, because all 24 training games of
this type are of the same kind: they have three decision points
while only requiring first-order theory of mind. Possibly,
these trivial games in the training block made the change to
the test blocks difficult for the subjects of (Hedden & Zhang,
2002), who were suddenly required to perform second-order
perspective taking in order to make optimal decisions in the
Matrix Games.
In the other training procedure, which we name Stepwise
training, subjects were therefore presented with three blocks
of games that are simple at first and become increasingly
complex with each block, subsequently requiring zero-order,
first-order, and second-order theory of mind to find the op-
timal decision (Figure 4; bottom panel). More precisely,
the first training block of Stepwise training consisted of 4
7See Appendix B for the numbers of subjects in each of the 8 resulting
groups and for the aggregate numbers of subjects resulting from the three
binary factor divisions.
games with just one decision point. These games are called
zero-order games, because they do not require application of
ToM. The second training block consisted of 8 games with
two decision points. These games require application of
first-order ToM, for example, in Figure 4 (middle of bottom
panel): “The opponent intends to move from B to C, because
his goal is to earn as many points as possible and 4 > 2”.
The third training block consisted of 8 games with three
decision points that require application of second-order ToM,
because the subject has to reason about the other player, and
take into account that the other player is reasoning about
them. The subject could make the following second-order
attribution to the opponent: “The opponent thinks that I
intend to move from C to D, because he knows that my
goal is to earn as many points as possible, and 2 > 1”.
The pay-off structures in the 8 games of this third training
block were chosen in such a way that they were diagnostic
of second-order ToM reasoning, in the sense that first-order
ToM reasoning does not lead to an optimal solution for them,
unlike in theUndifferentiated training games. (SeeAppendix
C for more explanation of our selection of payoff structures.)
We hypothesize a priori that the Stepwise training pro-
cedure provides scaffolding to support the representation of
increasinglymore complexmental states. Stepwise introduc-
tion, explanation, and practice of reasoning about each ad-
ditional decision point helps subjects integrate mental states
of increasing complexity into their decision-making process.
Support for this hypothesis is provided by studies of children,
who learn the orders of theory of mind one by one. Five-year
old children have already had multiple experiences in daily
life with first-order perspective taking. For them, second-
order false belief questions are in the zone of proximal de-
velopment. They require exposure to a number of such tasks,
in which they are asked to subsequently answer zero-order,
first-order and second-order questions about a story and to
justify their answers. In this way, they can be trained in
second-order perspective taking (Arslan et al., 2015; Arslan,
Taatgen, & Verbrugge, 2017).
For adults, second-order ToM in turn-taking games is sim-
ilarly in their zone of proximal development: they already
solve zero-order and first-order versions very well. We sur-
mise that Stepwise training helps them to completely master
zero- and first-order ToM in these games before building on
these answers in their second-order perspective-taking. Like
the developmental studies, our training phase also includes
asking subjects to explain what they should have done and
why in case they made a non-optimal decision.
2.4 Scaffold 2: Prompting predictions
The second factor, prompting subjects for predictions, was
manipulated in the first Test Block. Hedden and Zhang
(2002) prompted their subjects to predict Player 2’s decision
(in cell B, see Figure 1), before making their own decision.
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Figure 4: Schematic overview of the Undifferentiated and Stepwise training procedures for the Matrix Game. Undifferentiated
training consists of 24 different so-called trivial games (top panel, see Subsection 2.3 for explanation). Stepwise training
consists of 4 zero-order games, 8 first-order games, and 8 second-order games. The actual 20 training items all had different
payoff distributions (bottom panel).
Thus, subjects were explicitly asked to take the other player’s
perspective, and we hypothesize a priori that these prompts
help subjects to actually use second-order theory of mind
attributions such as “the opponent thinks that I intend to stay
at C” in their decision-making process.
We tested this hypothesis in the two Test Blocks of 32
second-order games each. In the first Test Block, we asked
half of the subjects, randomly assigned to the Prompt group,
to predict Player 2’s move before making their own deci-
sion. Subjects assigned to the No-Prompt group, in contrast,
were not explicitly asked to predict Player 2’s move; they
were required only to make their own decision throughout
the experiment. The second Test Block was added to test
whether prompting had long-lasting effects on performance.
No subject was asked to make predictions in the second
test block, and performance differences between the Prompt
group and the No-Prompt group would indicate lasting ef-
fects of prompting.
2.5 Scaffold 3: Visual Task representation
The third and final factor that we manipulated is the vi-
sual task representation. Before the training phase started,
subjects were randomly assigned to one of two task represen-
tations, which did not change anymore during the remainder
of the experiment. One of the representations was the Ma-
trix Game (Hedden & Zhang, 2002), which is sometimes
criticized for being very abstract and therefore difficult to
understand for subjects (Goodie et al., 2012). We therefore
devised a second representation, henceforth referred to as
Marble Drop, which is similar to the extensive-form game
trees so as to clarify the recursive structure of the decision-
making problem by displaying more intuitively who decides
where and what the consequences of each decision are (Fig-
ure 5) (Meijering, van Rijn, Taatgen, & Verbrugge, 2012).
Figure 5 depicts examples of zero-order, first-order, and
second-order Marble Drop games. A white marble is about
to drop, and its path can be manipulated by opening the left
or right trapdoor at each decision point. Player 1’s goal is to
let the white marble drop into the bin containing the darkest
possible marble of his/her target color (blue in these exam-
ple games), by controlling only the blue trapdoors. Player
2’s goal is to obtain the darkest possible orange marble, but
Player 2 can only control the orange trapdoors. The marbles
are ranked from light to dark, with darker marbles preferred
over lighter marbles, yielding payoff structures isomorphic
to those in matrix games. Each time, opening the left trap-
door provides access to a single bin, thus ending the game
(“to stay”). Opening the right trapdoor (“to go”) allows the
marble to move to the right to a new decision point, a pair of
trapdoors of the other color, where the other player decides.
The subject is always Player 1, deciding which of the first
pair of trapdoors to open.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Examples of zero-order (a), first-order (b), and second-order (c) Marble Drop games between Player 1 (blue) and
Player 2 (orange). The dashed lines in the figure represent the optimal decisions. (See Subsection 2.5 for explanation.)
For example, in the game of Figure 5, panel (c), Player 1
could reason as follows: “Suppose I were to open the right
blue trapdoor at my first decision point. Then after that,
Player 2 would not open his right orange trapdoor, because
he knows that if he did, I would then plan to open the left
blue final trapdoor, whichwould give him the lowest possible
payoff, the lightest orange marble. So he would open the left
orange trapdoor, which would in turn give me my highest
possible payoff, the darkest blue marble. So, let me open the
right blue trapdoor at the top.”
We designed the game in such a way that experience with
world physics, in particular with marble runs in childhood,
would allow subjects to easily imagine how themarble would
run through a game. Moreover, the interface of the game
was designed to support subjects to quickly see who could
change the path of the marble at which point in the game,
because the trapdoorswere color-coded according towho got
to decide where and the target color of that player. Finally,
we implemented the experiments with Marble Drop in such
a way that the subjects could see the marble drop down and,
after their initial decision at the first pair of trapdoors, they
could visually follow the marble as it coursed through the
Marble Drop device on the screen.
We hypothesize a priori that the new visual task repre-
sentation of Marble Drop provides scaffolding that supports
correct use of second-order theory of mind and thereby leads
to better decisions. A similar approach has been shown to
support subjects in learning other dynamic games, such as
Number Scrabble, which is formally equivalent to the well-
known game of Tic-Tac-Toe, whilst subjects perform signifi-
cantly better in the latter game (Michon, 1967; Simon, 1979;
Weitzenfeld, 1984).8
Importantly, Marble Drop is game-theoretically isomor-
phic to Matrix Games and thus requires essentially the same
reasoning (see next subsection). Instead of using numeri-
cal payoffs, as commonly used in experimental games, we
chose colored marbles to counter numerical but non-optimal
8Visual presentation has been shown to support other judgment and
decision tasks, see (Dambacher, Haffke, Groß, & Hübner, 2016).
reasoning strategies towards goals such as minimizing the
opponent’s outcomes, maximizing the sum of both players’
outcomes, or maximizing the difference between Player 1
and Player 2 outcomes.
Equivalence ofMatrixGame,Marble Drop and extensive
form game trees
All three game representations, namely the Matrix Game,
Marble Drop and the classical extensive form game trees,
turn out to be game-theoretically equivalent: the backward
induction strategy yields the same intermediate and final
results for them. The three representations all have terminal
nodes, subsequently named A, B, C, and D. Moreover, the
temporal order of play is the same: First, Player 1 decides
whether to “stay” and end the game at A or to “move” further.
Then at the second decision point, Player 2 decides whether
to stay and end the game at B or to move further. Finally, at
the third decision point, Player 1 decides whether to stay and
end the game in C or to move and end the game in D.
Finally, the payoff pairs correspond one-to-one between
the representations. For example, the extensive form game
tree of Figure 2 has the same payoff structure as the Matrix
Game of Figure 3. The payoff structure of the extensive form
game tree of Figure 1 corresponds to the Marble Drop of
Figure 5 (c), where payoff 1 in the game tree corresponds to
the lightest shade of the corresponding player’s target color,
and payoff 4 to the darkest shade.
2.6 Stimuli
Payoffs
The payoffs in Matrix Games are numerical, ranging from 1
to 4, whereas the payoffs in Marble Drop games are color-
gradedmarbles that have a one-to-onemapping to the numer-
ical values in the Matrix Games. The colors of the marbles
are four shades of orange and blue, taken from the HSV (i.e.,
hue, saturation and value) space. A sequential color palette
is computed by varying saturation, for a given hue and value.
This results in four shades (with saturation from .2 to 1) for
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each of the colors orange (hue = .1, value = 1) and blue (hue
= .6, value = 1).
Payoff structures
The payoff structures of the two-person three-stage turn tak-
ing games were adapted from the original game designs of
(Hedden & Zhang, 2002). The payoff structures are selected
so that the order of ToM reasoning mastered by the subjects
can be derived from the set of their first decisions in the
experimental games. The total set of payoff structures, bal-
anced for the number of decisions to continue or stop a game,
is limited to 16 items. These items are listed in Appendix
C, including a detailed discussion of the rationale behind the
exclusion criteria.9
2.7 Procedure
The 43 subjects in theMarbleDrop conditionwere first tested
on color-blindness. They had to be able to distinguish the
two colors blue and orange, and to correctly order the four
grades of both orange and blue in terms of darkness.
To familiarize themwith the rules of the sequential games,
all subjects were first presented with a training block that ei-
ther consisted of Undifferentiated training or Stepwise train-
ing. The instructions, which appeared on screen, explained
how to play the games and what the goal of each player was.
For example, the subjects in the Stepwise training and Mar-
ble Drop condition with orange as target color received the
following instruction about the first-order training games:
“In the next games, there are two sets of trapdoors. You con-
trol the orange trapdoors and the computer controls the blue
trapdoors. The computer is trying to let the white marble
end up in the bin with the darkest blue marble it can get. You
still have to attain the darkest orange marble you can get.
Note, the computer does not play with or against you.” For
an example full verbatim instruction set with illustrations,
see Appendix A.
The instructions alsomentioned that subjects were playing
against a computer-simulated player. Hedden and Zhang
(2002) have shown that inclusion of a cover story about a
purported human opponent did not affect ToM performance.
Each training game was played until either the subject or
the computer-simulated player decided to stop, or until the
last possible decision was made. After each training game,
subjects were presented with accuracy feedback indicating
whether the highest attainable payoff was obtained. In case
of an incorrect decision, an arrow pointed at the cell of
the Matrix Game (respectively the bin of Marble Drop) that
contained the highest attainable payoff and the subject was
asked to explain why that cell (or bin) was optimal for them.
9Note that none of the 16 game items in Table 2 corresponds to a
classical centipede (Rosenthal, 1981; Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) with
Nash equilibrium at A and an incentive for Player 1 to signal to Player 2 to
cooperate by moving on towards a Pareto-optimal outcome at D.
Because the feedback never referred to the other player’s
mental states, subjects had to infer these themselves.
The training block was followed by two test blocks, which
consisted of 32 second-order games each. As mentioned in
Subsection 2.4, the procedure for subjects in the Prompt and
No-Prompt groups differed in the first test block. Subjects
in the Prompt group were first asked to enter a prediction
of Player 2’s decision before they were asked to make a
decision at their own first decision point — between stay-or-
go in theMatrix Game, respectively between opening the left
or right trapdoor inMarble Drop. Subjects in the No-Prompt
group, in contrast, were not asked to make predictions. They
were asked only to make decisions. Accuracy feedback was
presented both after entering a prediction and after entering
a decision, but the arrow pointing to the highest attainable
payoffwas not shown anymore in the test blocks. Thefirst test
block consisted of 32 trials; each of the 16 payoff structures
was presented twice, but not consecutively. The items were
presented in a different random order for each subject. The
second test block, also consisting of 32 games, followed the
same procedure for all subjects: They were asked to make
their own first decisions only.
3 Results
3.1 Reaction times
Subjects were not instructed regarding the speed of respond-
ing: they were asked only to do the task as well as possible.
In the two test blocks consisting of 32 items each, subjects
were confronted with four occurrences each (in a random or-
der) of the 16 essentially different games (Table 2, Appendix
C). Fortunately, the reaction time data strongly speak against
the possibility of the subjects having used simple cognitive
strategies such as pattern recognition, because the mean re-
action time was still more than 8 seconds (M = 8.5, SE =
.61) even in Test Block 2.10
The setup of the prompt condition in Test Block 1 did
not allow us to make a more detailed analysis of the deci-
sion times, because the reaction times of the decisions that
subjects in the Prompt group made after having first made
an explicit prediction about the opponent’s next decision,
were expected to be much lower than the bare decisions of
subjects in the No-Prompt group, due to the experimental de-
sign. Moreover, for subjects in the Prompt group, we could
not gauge from their decision times whether their decisions
took shorter in Test Block 2 than in Test Block 1. There-
10In contrast, (Mehlhorn, Taatgen, Lebiere, & Krems, 2011) did find
signs of pattern recognition in their diagnostic reasoning task, indicated
by reaction times shorter than 1.5 seconds. For interesting experiments
validating that short response times correspond to instinctive reasoning and
long response times to slow reflective reasoning in judgment and decision
making, see (Rubinstein, 2013).
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fore, only the accuracy scores are discussed in the rest of the
current study.
3.2 Scaffolding effects
Figure 6 shows the proportions of accurate predictions for
each of the conditions in the experiment. The data suggest
effects of prompting, training and block, but not necessarily
of task representation. To test the effects of the scaffold-
ing manipulations, we analyzed the accuracy data of Test
Block 1 and Test Block 2 using binomial mixed-effect mod-
els, with subject and problem-ID as random effects (Baayen,
Davidson, & Bates, 2008). The training block was excluded
from analysis, because the trials differed between the Step-
wise and Undifferentiated types of training. Because we
were interested in the main effects of our manipulations
and the interactions on block, we first fitted a model with
Task representation (Marble Drop or Matrix Game), Prompt
(i.e., prompting or not for predictions about the opponent’s
choice at the second decision point), Training (i.e., the type
of training: Stepwise or Undifferentiated), and Block (i.e.,
Test Block 1 or 2) as main effect, and Task representation
× Block, Prompt × Block, Training × Block as interaction
effects.
Analysis of variance indicates main effects of Training
(stepwise better), Prompt, andBlock (allwith p < .002). The
effect of Task (matrix/marble) was not significant. Figure 6
suggests that interactions are also present, but most of these
could result from reduction in room for effects to manifest
themselves as accuracy approached the ceiling (and in fact
reached it for some subjects in some conditions).
Of more substantive interest, Prompt had a larger effect in
Block 1 than in Block 2 (p < .001 for the interaction overall,
and also for the interaction within each Task); the interaction
shows up in Figure 6 as greater slopes (between blocks) for
No-prompt than for Prompt. It is a clear cross-over inter-
action for the Marble game and this cannot be explained in
terms of compression of the scale. This effect could be inter-
preted as a non-lasting effect of Prompt: Prompting subjects
helps them in second-order ToM reasoning by breaking up
the reasoning steps, but after prompting stops, in Test Block
2, the advantage largely disappears.
3.3 Alternative strategies
One could argue that strictly competitive games — in the
sense that a win for one player is a loss for the other and vice
versa — are easier and more intuitive for people, in contrast
to the current game in which both the subject and the op-
ponent had the self-interested goal of maximizing their own
payoff. Even though the subjects were carefully instructed
about the objective of the game (see verbatim instructions
in Appendix A), it might be that some subjects played com-
petitively in the sense of maximizing the difference, namely
their own score minus the opponent’s score. Other subjects
might have played cooperatively in the sense of maximizing
social welfare, the sum of their and the opponent’s scores.
Therefore, we checked whether the behavior of a subject was
consistent with one of the strategies on the given items, using
a moving average of 11 trials. If the strategies could not be
discriminated based on the responses, the subject would be
assigned to more than one strategy.
As depicted in Figure 7, subjects likely did follow the
instructions to be self-interested by maximizing their own
payoff and to assume that the opponent was self-interested
too; especially in the second half of the experiment, more
than 80% could be so classified.
4 General Discussion
The main aim of our experiment was to find out how we can
best support adults in the perspective taking needed to make
optimal decisions in a three-step two-player game. We chose
three manipulations for which we had reason to believe that
they would help scaffold subjects’ second-order theory of
mind, namely 1) Stepwise training, 2) Prompting subjects
to make an explicit prediction of the opponent’s next choice
(that included the opponent’s taking the subject’s final choice
into account) and 3) a less abstract, easier to understand
visual task representation, namely Marble Drop.
Subjects clearly benefit from a carefully constructed Step-
wise training regime, in which they are first asked to make
decisions in a few one-choice versions that introduce the goal
and the game representation but do not require any reasoning
about an opponent, then a few two-choice versions in which
subjects have to use first-order theory of mind to predict
the opponent’s next (simple) choice between two end-points,
and finally a few three-choice versions for which second-
order theory of mind is required. Their accuracy is much
higher than for the other half of the subjects, who had gone
through a training regime in which all training games were
three-choice games with payoffs distributed in such a way
that the third choice made no difference for the optimal first
and second decisions. For such so-called trivial games in
this Undifferentiated training regime, first-order theory of
mind was always sufficient.
Prompting subjects to think about the opponent’s perspec-
tive at the next decision point helps them in making their
own optimal decision at the first decision point of the current
game. In particular, when explicitly prompted, subjects tend
to give correct predictions. However, prompting improves
performance mainly in the session in which it is applied, and
does not have much lasting effect on the subsequent session
without prompts.
Finally, it appears that the Task representation does not
really matter: Subjects achieve about the same accuracy
scores in the Marble Drop representation as in the more
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Figure 6: Accuracy results for all 8 conditions of the experiment for Test Block 1 and Test Block 2. Error bars represent one
standard error.
abstract Matrix Game. This surprised us for several reasons.
Firstly, we had carefully designed Marble Drop to be easy
to understand and to fit with people’s experience as children
with games in which marbles drop and slide down devices,
partly under control of the child. Secondly, the decision-
making literature abounds with examples in which a proper
visual representation improves people’s accuracy. Finally,
several subjects told us in the debriefing how insightful they
had found Marble Drop. Apparently, the less abstract visual
representation of Marble Drop is not sufficient to support
subjects to take the second-order perspective required to
make optimal decisions.
4.1 Errors of rationality and theory of mind
Zhang and colleagues argue that, for people to make an op-
timal first decision in three-move two-player Matrix Games,
they need two different capacities: a) perspective taking by
recursive theory of mind, to make a correct mental model of
their opponent and predict his next decision and b) instru-
mental rationality, to make an optimal first decision of their
own, based both on their mental model of the opponent and
an analysis of relevant payoffs. Thus, instrumental rational-
ity errors are made when subjects are not engaged in “fully
enacting the possible consequences of their opponent’s ac-
tion and making contingency plans based on these predicted
consequences” (Hedden & Zhang, 2002; Jones & Zhang,
2003; Zhang et al., 2012).
4.1.1 Rationality errors
In the Prompt group in Test Block 1, a number of subjects
fail to conclude from their correct prediction what their own
optimal decision should be. Sometimes subjects make the
opposite error: They first make an incorrect prediction about
the opponent’s next step, but do not to take it into account
when making their own, optimal, decision at the first deci-
sion point. We follow Hedden and Zhang (2002) in calling
both types of mismatch rationality errors. Subjects in the
Prompt group made rationality errors in 12.6% of trials in
the relevant Test Block 1.
If we look more closely at the total number of 191 (out
of 1504) trials in our experiment in which a subject made
a rationality error — trials with a correct decision but a
wrong prediction and vice versa — we see that subjects in
those trials tend to end the game by staying in cell A in the
Matrix Game or let the marble drop into the leftmost bin
of Marble Drop so as to receive the first possible pay-off (n
= 122) instead of giving the opponent a chance to play (n
= 69).11 This asymmetry is striking, considering that the
numbers of times a subject should stay or go according to
the optimal solution prescribed by game theory, had been
11Note that in our experiment, we can check for rationality errors only in
the Prompt group in the first test block.

















Figure 7: The y-axis shows the number of subjects that are
assigned to a specific strategy. On the x-axis is depicted the
center trial of the moving average. The “Maximize own pay-
off” corresponds to the task instructions.
balanced throughout the experiment (Table 2, Appendix C).
This finding indicates that a majority, around 2/3 of subjects,
use a risk-averse strategy when making a rationality error.
In contrast, in the studies of Zhang and colleagues this
“stay in cell A” type of rationality error occurred equally
often as the “move to cell B” type. Because all the trials in
our test blocks are diagnostic for second-order ToM, the pay-
off for the player was 3 for the first cell/bin in all such trials
in which they “played safe”.12 These subjects would forego
an attainable maximal payoff of 4 at a later stage of the game
(see lines 9–16 of Table 2, Appendix C). However, this type
of rationality error is rationalizable: The subjects could be
sure of gaining 3 points when staying at A, while they ran
12The difference between the tendencies of the rationality errors in these
two studies may be due to the fact that Hedden and Zhang also used a
number of payoff structures in which the subject’s payoff in cell A was 2.
We did not use these, because we needed to double-balance optimal “stay”
and “go” decisions at both the first and second decision points, in order to
distinguish whether a subject had a “myopic” or “predictive” mental model
of the opponent when we did not ask the subject to predict the opponent’s
next decision (see Appendix C for our selection criteria of payoff structures).
Hedden and Zhang (2002) always asked for a prediction, while we only did
so in Test Block 1 for the Prompt group.
the risk of gaining only 1 or 2 points if the opponent were to
unexpectedly decide differently from their predicted rational
decision. In these cases, subjects were not absolutely certain
that the opponent would act according to their prediction and
preferred to keep matters in their own hands.
There are also important similarities between our exper-
iment and Zhang and colleagues’ in terms of rationality er-
rors. Zhang et al. (2012) make a comparison of the ratios
of rationality errors in cases in which subjects need only
first-order theory of mind in cell B when making their own
decision in the role of Player 2, versus cases inwhich subjects
in the role of Player 1 need to make a prediction about their
opponent Player 2’s decision in cell B, requiring second-
order theory of mind. Interestingly, the ratios of rationality
errors that subjects make are almost the same, whether they
need to use first-order or second-order theory of mind, and
rather low in both cases: decreasing from around 1/5 in the
beginning of the 64 test games down to around 1/10 at the
end (Zhang et al., 2012). Similarly, in our experiment, ratio-
nality errors occurred only around 1/8 of items in Test Block
1.
Therefore, both Zhang, Hedden and Chia and our current
study corroborate the earlier results of Hedden and Zhang:
The ratios of rationality errors do not significantly differ
between the condition in which subjects play standard Ma-
trix Games against a myopic (zero-order ToM) opponent or
against a predictive (first-order ToM) opponent (Hedden &
Zhang, 2002). Thus, all these studies support the conclu-
sion that instrumental rationality (making your own decision
on the basis of your prediction of the opponent’s next de-
cision) is distinct from and apparently easier for subjects
than the perspective taking required to make a correct men-
tal model of the opponent, requiring second-order theory of
mind (Jones & Zhang, 2003).
4.1.2 Errors in recursive perspective taking
In the current experiment, the non-optimal decisions that
subjects make are mostly due to difficulties in making a
correct model of the opponent. Because we usually did not
ask subjects for explicit predictions (only the Prompt group
in the Test Block 1), we have to gauge their predictions
from their decisions and we cannot provide an analysis of
perspective-taking errors in their predictions. However, the
patterns of decisions per subject indicate that it was clear to
them that the opponent’s goal, like the subject’s own, was
to self-interestedly maximize their own payoff; they did not
think, for example, that the goal was to maximize the joint
payoff or to maximize the difference between the players’
payoffs (see Subsection 3.3).
Our previous cognitive modeling work on Marble Drop
indicates that adults, different from children, do take the op-
ponent’s goals into account. However, when subjects make
non-optimal decisions, their decision patterns over all payoff
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structures often fit with having a too simple model of the
opponent, using only first-order theory of mind. For exam-
ple, they expect the opponent to always play safe by staying
at B if either of their payoffs in C or D is smaller than the
one in B, or to always take a risk by moving on if either of
their payoffs in C or D is larger than the one in B. Both these
simple models do not take into account that the opponent is
also reasoning about the subject’s final decision. Based on
feedback, many subjects improve their model of the oppo-
nent in the course of the experiment and start to correctly
make a second-order theory of mind model. Starting out
“as simple as possible”, they learn to reason “as complex as
necessary” (Meijering et al., 2014).
4.2 How do subjects reason when they make
optimal decisions?
We surmise that subjects who make optimal decisions do
not apply a fixed simple reasoning strategy based on com-
parison of payoffs only, such as backward induction, without
explicitly reasoning about mental states.13 Our attribution of
recursive perspective taking to subjects who make optimal
decisions is corroborated by a related Marble Drop experi-
ment, in which subjects were also told that they were playing
against a self-interested computer opponent (Meijering et al.,
2012). Subjects’ eye movements show them not to use back-
ward induction. They attend mostly to the trapdoors, the
decision points, not only to the payoff pairs, which would
have been sufficient for backward induction.
Subjects’ eye movements first show predominantly left-
to-right progressions and only then, for the more difficult
payoff structures, their eyes make right-to-left progressions
at the end of reasoning about a game. This fits what we
dub the “forward reasoning plus backtracking” reasoning
strategy: you start at the first decision point in a game and
proceed to the next one for as long as higher outcomes are
expected to be available at future decision points; when you
discover that you may have unknowingly skipped the highest
attainable outcome at a previous decision point, you jump
back to inspect whether that outcome is indeed attainable
(Meijering et al., 2012).
This temporal order of subjects’ reasoning is suggestive
of causal reasoning, which they have learnt from early child-
hood (Gopnik et al., 2004): First “What would happen if I
chose to move on to the right?”, then “What would happen
if the opponent then chose to move on to the right as well?”,
and finally “What would I then choose at the final pair of
trapdoors? Oh, that would give my opponent the lightest-
13Note that to apply backward induction, no theory of mind is needed,
but to discover it, second-order theory of mind is required (Verbrugge,
2009). We took care that subjects did not have much pre-knowledge of
game theory, in particular, none of them had been exposed to backward
induction. Interestingly, two subjects told us in the exit interview that, after
playing many different game items, they had discovered a “neat trick” that
saved them time. That trick turned out to be backward induction.
colored blue marble, so he probably wouldn’t want to let me
have the final choice and end up there.”
Moreover, when we compare the reaction times with com-
putational models of backward induction and of forward rea-
soning plus backtracking, it turns out that subjects’ patterns
of decision times on all game items fit “forward reason-
ing plus backtracking” much better than backward induction
(Bergwerff, Meijering, Szymanik, Verbrugge, & Wierda,
2014).14 Evidence for such forward reasoning has also been
found in some other turn-taking games, such as sequen-
tial bargaining and a sequential version of the trust game
(Johnson et al., 2002; Evans & Krueger, 2011).
4.3 Comparison with another study support-
ing second-order perspective-taking
Goodie, Doshi and Young (2012) claim that perspective tak-
ing by itself is not the bottleneck in turn-taking games re-
quiring second-order theory of mind. In line with this, they
propose twoways to support people in applying second-order
ToM in a turn-taking game such as the Matrix game. Their
first manipulation is to turn the abstract Matrix Game into
a game-theoretically isomorphic version that has a concrete
military cover story; this turns out to have no effect. Their
second manipulation is to transform the Matrix Game into a
competitive fixed-sum game with a single pay-off shown per
cell. They argue that in these zero-sum games, adults are
perfectly able to apply second-order ToM against a predic-
tive player, with more than 90% correct decisions (Goodie et
al., 2012). They argue that such strictly competitive games
are more natural for people (as also claimed by (Bornstein,
Gneezy, & Nagel, 2002)).
However, at second sight, there is an alternative explana-
tion for their positive findings about the zero-sum game. In
their Experiments 1 and 2, all 40 critical trials of their 80-trial
test phase displayed the same ordering of payoffs over the
four subsequent leaves of the centipede-like decision tree,
namely 3–2–1–4; these had been mapped to probabilities
with different cardinalities, but in the same order (Goodie et
al., 2012). This similarity between items may have enabled
their subjects after a number of trials to understand that the
solutions all followed the same pattern (similar to our game
3 of Table 2 of Appendix C). The successive three optimal
choices are always the same for the zero-sum games: Player
1 stays at A, because Player 2 stays at B, because Player 1
goes on to D.
In our experiment, such pattern recognition could not arise
because each subject encountered only 4 spaced instances of
14Decision times were strongly correlated to the complexity of payoff
structures: for game items in which it was sufficient to reason through the
game from the beginning to the end by forward reasoning without having to
do backtracking, such as game16 ofTable 9 (AppendixC), subjects’ reaction
times were significantly shorter than for items in which backtracking was
needed, such as game 2.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2018 Supporting second-order theory of mind in turn-taking games 91
each of the 16 payoff structures, and all these 16 of our
payoff structures were essentially different (see Table 2 of
Appendix C). Also, in real life, many important social situa-
tions requiring second-order ToM cannot be re-cast as zero-
sum games, but only as general-sum games, so the Matrix
Game or Marble Drop appear to be better ways to train peo-
ple in second-order perspective taking for real-life intelligent
interactions.
4.4 Implications: De-biasing decision makers
The findings of the current study, in particular the notion of
scaffolding decision making for subjects by stepwise train-
ing, could also be of interest in attempting to reduce the
biases of decision makers in other social situations. For ex-
ample, people often allocate resources in a parochial way.
Without explicitly wanting to harm out-groups, people re-
duce their own earnings in order to support their own in-
group (e.g., their nation), even if their decision is so detri-
mental to an out-group (e.g., another nation) that the overall
outcome of their decision is negative, while it could have
been positive (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Baron, Ritov,
& Greene, 2013). One way to reduce this type of in-group
bias is to change the task representation by asking subjects
to compute all gains and losses (Baron, 2001, Experiment
2). In view of the results of the current study, it might alter-
natively be helpful to offer the subjects a stepwise training
in which they have to make allocation decisions of increas-
ing complexity and with growing numbers of parties. After
each non-optimal allocation decision in the stepwise training
block, subjects could be shown which other decision would
have had a more positive overall outcome and they could
be asked to explain why that alternative decision is better.
It would be interesting to compare the effects of these two
de-biasing methods, asking for explicit computations and
stepwise training, in a future experiment.
A related phenomenon is the bias towards self payoffs
in sequential trust games, where people appear not to be
sufficiently interested in perspective-taking to even gather
information about the opponents’ payoffs, often to their own
detriment (Evans & Krueger, 2014). Another type of bias
is the false consensus phenomenon, in which people think
that their own judgments and decisions are more prevalent
in their community than is actually the case (Ross, Greene,
& House, 1977). Related to this, the “Isn’t everyone like
me?” bias occurs in a normal form game in which subjects
who choose one action ego-centrically tend to believe that
other players will choose that same action in a larger pro-
portion than is expected by subjects who choose the other
action (Rubinstein & Salant, 2016). It would be interesting
to investigate whether these biases can also be alleviated by
step-by-step training in properly taking other people’s per-
spectives into account.
4.5 Conclusion
In two-player turn-taking games with three decision points,
reasoning about someone else’s decision that in turn depends
on your own plan is difficult, even for adults. The required
second-order perspective taking (“the opponent thinks that
I would intend to go left at the last decision point”) does
not appear to happen automatically or spontaneously. How-
ever, our results have shown that subjects in such turn-taking
games can learn to take the required perspective to make
optimal decisions when they are knowingly playing against
a self-interested opponent taking the subject’s goal into ac-
count.
From a theoretical perspective, it would seem that subjects
could be supported by three manipulations, separately or
in combination: 1) step-wise training, in which they are
subsequently trained to make and explain decisions in games
with one, two and three decision point that require zero-order,
first-order and second-order theory of mind, respectively;
2) prompting subjects to predict what the opponent would
choose at the next decision point before making their own
decision at the first decision point; and 3) using an intuitive
visual interpretation, namely Marble Drop, which is closer
to people’s daily experiences than the Matrix Game.
It turns out that, while prompting for predictions has
largely a short-time effect and the visual task presentation
does not make much of a difference, there is a clear positive
main effect of stepwise training. Thus, stepwise training
can be used to teach people to recursively put themselves
in other people’s shoes, which is important in many social
interactions, from the simple turn-taking Matrix Game to
international peace negotiations.
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Appendix A: Instructions
Here follows a sample set of instructions as presented verba-
tim to subjects, all of them given in the form for the Marble
Drop task representation. First we present the instructions
for Stepwise training, then the instructions for the test blocks
for the Prompting group. The instructions for other condi-
tions are similar.
Instructions for Step-wise training
The subjects first received the instructions for zero-order
games on the screen, after which they practiced four zero-
order games. Then they were shown the instructions for
first-order games, after which they practiced eight different
first-order games. Finally, they received the instructions for
the second-order games on the screen, after which they went
through eight second-order practice games.
Instructions zero-order games
In this task, you will be playing marble games such as the
one in the figure below.
A white marble is about to drop and you can change its path
by removing one of two orange trapdoors. The white marble
has to end up in the bin with the darkest orange marble.
Press \ to remove the left trapdoor, and / to remove the right
trapdoor.
Press spacebar to begin.
Instructions first-order games
In the next games, there are two sets of trapdoors. You
control the orange trapdoors and the computer controls the
blue trapdoors. The computer is trying to let the white
marble end up in the bin with the darkest blue marble it can
get. You still have to attain the darkest orange marble you
can get. Note, the computer does not playwith or against you.
Press spacebar to begin.
Instructions second-order games
In the next games, there are three sets of trapdoors. Again,
you control the orange trapdoors, and the computer controls
the blue trapdoors. Note, for its decision, the computer
takes into account what your choice will be at the third set
of trapdoors. Remember, the computer does not play with
or against you.
Good luck! Press spacebar to begin.
Instructions at the start of the Test Blocks
After the training items, the subjects were shown new in-
structions at the start of the first and the second Test Block.
Below, we present the instructions at the beginning of Test
Block 1 and Test Block 2 for the Prompt group.
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Instructions second-order prediction-decision games:
Test Block 1
The next games are slightly different. First, you have to
predict what the computer will do at the second set of
trapdoors. Secondly, you have to decide what to do at the
first set of trapdoors.
To speed up the experiment, the animations are removed
from the games.
Good luck! Press spacebar to begin.
Instructions second-order prediction-decision games:
Test Block 2
In the next games, you do not have to predict anymore what
the computer will do at the second set of trapdoors. You
immediately receive feedback after you have decided what
to do at the first set of trapdoors.
Good luck! Press spacebar to begin.
Appendix B: the 2 × 2 × 2 groups and
allocation of subjects
Altogether, there were 93 subjects. Per manipulation, here
are the totals of subjects:
• Training: Stepwise training 46, Undifferentiated train-
ing 47;
• Prompting for predictions: Prompt 47, No-Prompt 46;
• Task representation: 43Marble Drop, 50Matrix Game.
Table 1 gives the numbers of subjects per group.
Appendix C: Pay-off structures
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 represent the relevant payoff structures,
together with corresponding correct decisions and predic-
tions for our experiment. Letters A, B, C and D stand for the
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bins in the Marble Drop game from left to right, respectively
for subsequent cells in the Matrix game. Each payoff pair
represents the payoffs of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively,
where 1 represents the lowest payoff (corresponding to the
lightest shade of their target color in Marble Drop), while 4
represents the highest payoff (corresponding to the darkest
shade of their target color in Marble Drop).
Second-order payoff structures for games with
three decision points
The following computation has been adapted from Section
2.1.2 of (Hedden & Zhang, 2002). In principle, there are
24 × 24 = 576 different payoff structures for three-decision
Matrix and Marble Drop games, on the basis of dividing
pairs of payoffs from 1, 2, 3, 4 for both players over four
cells. However, by far not all of these 576 games would
be suitable for testing subjects’ second-order ToM in a turn-
taking game. Let us describe our exclusion criteria by which
we selected the 16 different games that we used for game
items in the two test blocks as well as in the final 8 games of
Stepwise Training.
Excluding payoff structures requiring only zero-order
ToM. Payoff structures are excluded if Player 1’s payoff
in A is either a 1 or a 4, because Player 1 would not need
to reason about Player 2’s decision at all. It is obvious that
Player 1 should continue the game if his payoff in A is a 1 and
stop if his payoff in A is a 4. The game in Figure 8 (right) is
an example in which Player 1 should immediately decide to
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Figure 8: Two trivial Matrix Games: The game on the left is
a so-called trivial first-order game. See text for explanation.
The game on the right does not require any ToM reasoning at
all, because Player 1’s maximum payoff is already available
in cell A.
stop in A. Therefore, in line with Hedden and Zhang (2002),
we focused on so-called 2- and 3-starting games, associated
with payoff structures in which Player 1’s first payoff was a
2 or a 3, respectively.
Excluding “trivial” payoff structures requiring only first-
order ToM. Of the remaining payoff structures, we ex-
cluded the so-called trivial ones in which Player 2’s payoff
in B was either lower or higher than both his payoffs in C
and D. The left matrix of Figure 8 depicts an example of
such a game: Player 2 does not need to reason about Player
1’s last possible decision, as his payoffs in C and D are both
more preferable than his payoff in B. This included payoff
structures in which Player 2’s payoff in B was either a 1 or
a 4, because Player 2 would not need to reason about Player
1’s last possible decision between C and D. Accordingly,
first-order reasoning on the part of Player 1 would suffice.
Excluding payoff structures that do not distinguish be-
tween attributed opponent types. The next two exclusion
criteria are based on the type of Player 2 that a subject could
be reasoning about. A subject, always assigned to the role
of Player 1, might be reasoning about a zero-order Player
2 who would not reason about the subject’s last possible
decision. Hedden and Zhang call such a Player 2 “myopic”
(short-sighted), because they only consider their own payoffs
in B and C. In contrast, a subject might be reasoning about
an hypothesized first-order or “predictive” Player who does
reason about (“predict”) the subject’s last possible decision.
Because Player 1’s decision at A depends on Player 2’s
decision at B, payoff structures that yield the same answer
for a zero-order and a first-order Player 2 cannot inform us
about the level of ToM reasoning on the part of Player 1. We
consider these payoff structures to be non-diagnostic, and
therefore we exclude them from the final set of stimuli. Hed-
den and Zhang, who prompted each subjects for predictions
of Player 2’s choice at B, could include such payoff structures
as long as the correct prediction of Player 2’s move at the
Table 2: Payoff structures of second-order games, adapted
from (Hedden & Zhang, 2002)








A B C D
1 3, 2 1 , 3 2, 4 4, 1 stay stay
2 3, 4 1, 2 2, 3 4, 1 stay stay
3 3, 1 2, 3 1, 4 4, 2 stay stay
4 3, 4 2, 2 1, 3 4, 1 stay stay
5 3, 1 4, 3 1, 2 2, 4 go stay
6 3, 2 4, 3 1, 1 2, 4 go stay
7 3, 3 4, 2 1, 1 2, 4 go stay
8 3, 4 4, 2 1, 1 2, 3 go stay
9 3, 1 4, 3 1, 4 2, 2 stay go
10 3, 2 4, 3 1, 4 2, 1 stay go
11 3, 3 4, 2 1, 4 2, 1 stay go
12 3, 4 4, 2 1, 3 2, 1 stay go
13 3, 2 1, 3 2, 1 4, 4 go go
14 3, 4 1, 2 2, 1 4, 3 go go
15 3, 1 2, 3 1, 2 4, 4 go go
16 3, 4 2, 2 1, 1 4, 3 go go
second decision point was opposite for imagined zero- and
first-order Player 2s. In contrast, we prompted only half of
our subjects (the Prompt group) for predictions in the first
test block and none of them in the second test block, so we
had to exclude all these items.
Balancing the decisions and predictions between “stop”
and “go”. We selected a final set of stimuli, which wewere
able to (double-)balance for both the number of optimal stay
and go decisions of Player 1 and the number of optimal stay
and go decisions of Player 2. Because this was only possible
for 3-starting games, we excluded the 2-starting games. The
final balancing left us with 16 unique payoff structures (Table
2).
Stepwise training
Let us now present the payoff structures for the training
games in the Stepwise training condition, in which the sub-
jects are first presented with 4 zero-order games, then 8
first-order games, and finally 8 second-order games. As
a reminder, zero-order games have one decision point with
only the two possibilities A andB; first-order games have two
decision points and the subsequent possibilities A, B, and C;
finally, second-order games have three decision points and
the subsequent possibilities A, B, C, and D.
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Table 3: Payoff structures of zero-order games with one de-
cision point. Each payoff pair represents the payoffs of Player
1 and Player 2, respectively
Payoffs Player 1 and 2 Optimal decision
Player 1 at A
A B
1, 3 3, 2 go
3, 2 1, 1 stay
4, 2 2, 4 stay
3, 2 4, 4 go
Zero-order training games
The four payoff structures used in our zero-order training
games are presented as four rows in Table 3. The final
column represents for each of the four payoff structures the
optimal decision for Player 1 at the decision point: stay
at A or go on to B. Note that we have chosen the sets of
payoff structures such that optimal (“correct”) decisions are
balanced between stay and go over the zero-order games.
First-order training games
The fourth column in Table 4 represents for each of the 8 first-
order payoff structures (rows in the table) the corresponding
correct prediction about Player 2’s decision at the second
decision point: stay at B or go on to C. The fifth column
represents the optimal “correct” decisions of Player 1 at the
first decision point: stay at A or go on to B.
We have chosen the 8 first-order payoff structures such that
they are all diagnostic of first-order ToM for Player 1, in the
sense that Player 1’s optimal decision to stay or go at the first
decision point depends on correctly predicting the decision
of a rational Player 2 at the second decision point. That is to
say, Player 1’s payoff in A is not larger than both of Player
1’s payoffs in B and C, nor is it smaller than both Player 1’s
payoffs in B and C; instead, it is in between those payoffs,
therefore, it really matters whether Player 2 will choose to
stay at B or go on to C.
Note that we have chosen the sets of payoff structures
such that both correct predictions and correct decisions are
balanced between stay and go over all first-order game items.
Second-order training games Table 2 presents the 16 di-
agnostic second-order games of which 8 are selected in the
last step of step-wise training.
Undifferentiated training
Table 5 presents 24 trivial payoff structures. These games
have the same three decision points as the second-order
games. However, they only require first-order ToM for Player
1 to make the correct decision, because Player 2 can make
Table 4: Payoff structures of first-order games with two deci-
sion points. Each payoff pair represents the payoffs of Player
1 and Player 2, respectively
Payoff pairs Players 1, 2 Correct
prediction
Player 2 at B
Optimal
decision
Player 1 at A
A B C
2, 1 1, 2 3, 3 go go
2, 3 1, 2 3, 1 stay stay
2, 1 3, 2 1, 3 go stay
2, 3 3, 2 1, 1 stay go
3, 2 2, 3 4, 4 stay go
3, 4 2, 3 4, 2 stay stay
3, 2 4, 3 2, 4 go stay
3, 4 4, 3 2, 2 go stay
an optimal decision without taking Player 1’s final decision
into account.
For example, if the game of row (a) gets to B, Player 2 will
always move from B to C regardless of what Player 1 would
choose at the third decision point, because for Player 2, both
payoff 4 in C and payoff 3 in D are better than his payoff in
B. Therefore, Player 1 should predict that Player 2 will go
on to C . On the basis of this prediction, Player 1 can safely
go on to B, and at the final decision point, Player 1 can stay
at C to get the optimal attainable payoff, namely 3.
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Table 5: Payoff structures of trivial first-order games with
three decision points. This table has been adapted from Ap-
pendix B of (Hedden & Zhang, 2002)
ID Payoff pairs Players 1, 2 Correct
prediction
Pl. 2 at B
Optimal
decision
Pl. 1 at A
A B C D
a 2, 1 4, 2 3, 4 1, 3 go go
b 3, 1 4, 2 2, 3 1, 4 go stay
c 2, 4 1, 3 4, 1 3, 2 stay stay
d 3, 4 4, 3 1, 1 2, 2 stay go
e 2, 1 3, 2 4, 3 1, 4 go go
f 3, 4 4, 3 1, 2 2, 1 stay go
g 2, 4 1, 3 3, 1 4, 2 stay stay
h 3, 1 4, 2 2, 4 1, 3 go stay
i 3, 4 4, 3 2, 2 1, 1 stay go
j 2, 4 1, 3 4, 2 3, 1 stay stay
k 3, 1 4, 2 1, 4 2, 3 go stay
l 2, 1 4, 2 3, 3 1, 4 go go
m 3, 4 4, 3 2, 1 1, 2 stay go
n 3, 1 4, 2 1, 3 2, 4 go stay
o 2, 1 3, 2 4, 4 1, 3 go go
p 2, 4 1, 3 3, 2 4, 1 stay stay
q 3, 4 2, 3 4, 1 1, 2 stay stay
r 2, 4 4, 3 1, 2 3, 1 stay go
s 2, 1 1, 2 4, 3 3, 4 go go
t 3, 4 4, 1 1, 2 2, 3 go stay
u 2, 1 1, 2 3, 4 4, 3 go go
v 2, 4 3, 3 1, 2 4, 1 stay go
w 3, 4 4, 1 2, 2 1, 3 go stay
x 3, 4 1, 3 4, 2 2, 1 stay stay
